A formal theory of lobbying behaviour

DOI10.1002/OCA.4660040106zbMATH Open0503.90100OpenAlexW2048803471MaRDI QIDQ4739697FDOQ4739697

Jennifer F. Reinganum

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Optimal Control Applications \& Methods (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/oca.4660040106

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumdisorganized oppositiondynamic game-theoretic frameworkoptimal rate of lobbying expenditurestrategic lobbying behaviour

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Dynamic programming (90C39) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Mathematical economics (91B99) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Operations research and management science (90B99)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A class of differential games for which the closed-loop and open-loop Nash equilibria coincide

Cited In (2)

• Differential game models in management science
• The complexity of probabilistic lobbying

This page was built for publication: A formal theory of lobbying behaviour

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4739697)