An Analysis of Simple Voting Systems for Electing Committees
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Publication:3926312
DOI10.1137/0141041zbMath0471.90013OpenAlexW2066855419MaRDI QIDQ3926312
Publication date: 1981
Published in: SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/0141041
Related Items (20)
On stable rules for selecting committees ⋮ Properties of multiwinner voting rules ⋮ A social choice approach to ordinal group activity selection ⋮ It is difficult to tell if there is a Condorcet spanning tree ⋮ Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives ⋮ Gehrlein stable committee with multi-modal preferences ⋮ Strategy-proof consensus rules for committee elections. ⋮ Coincidence of Condorcet committees ⋮ How hard is it to tell which is a Condorcet committee? ⋮ Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules ⋮ POPULAR SPANNING TREES ⋮ Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates ⋮ Voting and vagueness ⋮ On the rule of \(k\) names ⋮ Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate’s Will? ⋮ Social acceptability of Condorcet committees ⋮ When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees? ⋮ Electing a committee with dominance constraints ⋮ Condorcet winning sets ⋮ The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
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