On the reversal bias of the minimax social choice correspondence

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2016.03.003MaRDI QIDQ277309zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daniela Bubboloni, Michele Gori

Publication date 4 May 2016

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1508.05948

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Abstract: We introduce three different qualifications of the reversal bias in the framework of social choice correspondences. For each of them, we prove that the Minimax social choice correspondence is immune to it if and only if the number of voters and the number of alternatives satisfy suitable arithmetical conditions. We prove those facts thanks to a new characterization of the Minimax social choice correspondence and using a graph theory approach. We discuss the same issue for the Borda and Copeland social choice correspondences.

Recommendations

• Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences
• Preference reversal and strategy-proofness with more than three alternatives
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Cites work

• Anonymous and neutral majority rules
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• Consequences of reversing preferences
• Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
• Geometry of voting
• Graph theory
• Scoring rules and social choice properties: some characterizations
• Symmetric majority rules
• Tournament solutions and majority voting

Cited in

(4)

• Breaking ties in collective decision-making
• The flow network method
• Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences
• Combinatorics of Election Scores

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