Three ways to compute accurately the probability of the referendum paradox

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2011.04.006zbMATH Open1229.91113OpenAlexW2082420718MaRDI QIDQ554497FDOQ554497

Authors: Dominique Lepelley, Vincent Merlin, J. L. Rouet 

Publication date: 4 August 2011

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.04.006

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
• Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The probability of conflicts in a U. S. presidential type election
• On the probability to act in the European Union

Cited In (8)

• Majority Efficient Representation of the Citizens in a Federal Union
• A note on the direct democracy deficit in two-tier voting
• The probability of majority inversion in a two-stage voting system with three states
• Asymptotic probability of majority inversion under a general binomial voting model
• The theoretical Shapley-Shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential electoral system
• The probability of conflicts in a U. S. presidential type election
• The number of parties and decision-making in legislatures
• Probability of majority inversion with three states and interval preferences

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