Three ways to compute accurately the probability of the referendum paradox

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2011.04.006MaRDI QIDQ554497zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dominique Lepelley, Vincent Merlin, J. L. Rouet

Publication date 4 August 2011

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.04.006

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1414348 (Why is no real title available?)
• On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
• On the probability to act in the European Union
• Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
• The probability of conflicts in a U. S. presidential type election

Cited in

(8)

• The probability of conflicts in a U. S. presidential type election
• Asymptotic probability of majority inversion under a general binomial voting model
• The probability of majority inversion in a two-stage voting system with three states
• A note on the direct democracy deficit in two-tier voting
• The theoretical Shapley-Shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential electoral system
• The number of parties and decision-making in legislatures
• Probability of majority inversion with three states and interval preferences
• Majority Efficient Representation of the Citizens in a Federal Union

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