Equal, proportional, and mixed sharing of cooperative production under the threat of sabotage

DOI10.1007/S00712-013-0371-3MaRDI QIDQ1651024zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jörg Franke

Publication date 16 July 2018

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-013-0371-3

zbMATH Keywords

sabotagesharing rulescooperative production

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Production models (90B30)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Contest success functions: an extension
• Cooperative production and efficiency
• HELPING AND SABOTAGING IN TOURNAMENTS
• Microeconomic theory
• Natural team sharing and team productivity
• On sabotage in collective tournaments
• Sabotaging potential rivals
• Strategy and dynamics in contests
• The theory of contests: a survey
• Why did the west extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective

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