Equal, proportional, and mixed sharing of cooperative production under the threat of sabotage

DOI10.1007/S00712-013-0371-3zbMATH Open1402.91230OpenAlexW1985734052MaRDI QIDQ1651024FDOQ1651024

Authors: Jörg Franke 

Publication date: 16 July 2018

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-013-0371-3

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zbMATH Keywords

sabotagesharing rulescooperative production

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Production models (90B30)

Cites Work

• Microeconomic theory
• The theory of contests: a survey
• Strategy and dynamics in contests
• Why did the west extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective
• Contest success functions: an extension
• HELPING AND SABOTAGING IN TOURNAMENTS
• Sabotaging potential rivals
• Natural team sharing and team productivity
• Cooperative production and efficiency
• On sabotage in collective tournaments

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