Collective action: experimental evidence
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Publication:324140
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.06.005zbMATH Open1394.91080OpenAlexW3125323684MaRDI QIDQ324140FDOQ324140
Authors: María Victoria Anauati, Brian Feld, Sebastian Galiani, Gustavo Torrens 
Publication date: 10 October 2016
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.005
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Cites Work
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
- Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
- Separating the hawks from the doves: evidence from continuous time laboratory games
- Step returns in threshold public goods: A meta- and experimental analysis
- Non-excludable public good experiments
- Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
- Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games
- Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
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