Collective action: experimental evidence

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.06.005MaRDI QIDQ324140zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors María Victoria Anauati, Brian Feld, Sebastian Galiani, Gustavo Torrens

Publication date 10 October 2016

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.005

zbMATH Keywords

multiple equilibriacollective actionlaboratory experiment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1168312 (Why is no real title available?)
• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
• Non-excludable public good experiments
• Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games
• Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Separating the hawks from the doves: evidence from continuous time laboratory games
• Step returns in threshold public goods: A meta- and experimental analysis
• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games

Cited in

(4)

• The dynamics of collective action
• The weakness of strong ties: Collective action failure in a highly cohesive group*
• When Does One Bad Apple Spoil the Barrel? An Evolutionary Analysis of Collective Action
• Protests as strategic games: experimental evidence from Hong Kong's antiauthoritarian movement

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Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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