Identifiability of individual contributions in a threshold public goods experiment

DOI10.1006/JMPS.1997.1203zbMATH Open0937.91031OpenAlexW2076904287WikidataQ52229779 ScholiaQ52229779MaRDI QIDQ1293897FDOQ1293897

Authors: Rachel T. A. Croson, Melanie Beth Marks 

Publication date: 15 September 1999

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Psychology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/92114c22ec807d61b3276ee05e23813c3cfbf8d9

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 952970

zbMATH Keywords

public goodscontribution behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Experimental studies (91A90) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
• Identifiability of individual contributions in a threshold public goods experiment
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (10)

• Special issue on Experimental economics
• The evolution of altruism in spatial threshold public goods games via an insurance mechanism
• Strategy and equity: An ERC-analysis of the Güth-van Damme game
• The limit to behavioral inertia and the power of default in voluntary contribution games
• An experimental analysis of team production in networks
• Real-time monitoring in a public-goods game
• Can priming cooperation increase public good contributions?
• Identifiability of individual contributions in a threshold public goods experiment
• The effect of disclosing identities in a socially incentivized public good game
• Linear public goods experiments: a meta-analysis

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