A note on stochastic public revelation and voluntary contributions to public goods

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.12.009MaRDI QIDQ498784zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John M. Spraggon, Lucía Andrea Vergara Sobarzo, John K. Stranlund

Publication date 29 September 2015

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.009

zbMATH Keywords

experimentspublic goodspublic revelation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Public goods (91B18)

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Cited in

(11)

• Dynamic voluntary provision of public goods with uncertainty: a stochastic differential game model
• Information disclosure under liability: an experiment on public bads
• Voluntary contributions to a public good when partial contribution is a dominant strategy
• Communication and visibility in public goods provision
• Voluntary contributions to a dynamic public good: experimental evidence
• The Mixed Effect of Voluntary Revelation: Evidence from Threshold Public Goods Game Experiments
• The experimetrics of public goods: inferring motivations from contributions
• Peers or police?: the effect of choice and type of monitoring in the provision of public goods
• The effect of disclosing identities in a socially incentivized public good game
• Bygones in a public project
• On increased risk and the voluntary provision of public goods

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