The effect of disclosing identities in a socially incentivized public good game

DOI10.3390/G12020032zbMATH Open1478.91046OpenAlexW3154696595MaRDI QIDQ2052525FDOQ2052525

Authors Britta Butz, Christine Harbring

Publication date 26 November 2021

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020032

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationlaboratory experimentsocial dilemmaanonymitycharitable givingdonationspublic good gamepro-socialityteam incentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• A note on stochastic public revelation and voluntary contributions to public goods
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• Reputation and influence in charitable giving: an experiment
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• Identifiability of individual contributions in a threshold public goods experiment

Cites work

• An experimental investigation of intrinsic motivations for giving
• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
• Lab-sophistication: does repeated participation in laboratory experiments affect pro-social behaviour?
• Nash as an organizing principle in the voluntary provision of public goods: Experimental evidence
• Public good provision in blended groups of partners and strangers
• Warm-Glow versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments

Cited in

(10)

• Identity in public goods contribution
• Public disclosure of players' conduct and common resources harvesting: experimental evidence from a Nairobi slum
• Cost-(in)effective public good provision: an experimental exploration
• The Mixed Effect of Voluntary Revelation: Evidence from Threshold Public Goods Game Experiments
• Introduction to the special issue ``pro-sociality and cooperation
• Relative social status and conformism: experimental evidence on local public good contributions
• A note on stochastic public revelation and voluntary contributions to public goods
• Identities, selection, and contributions in a public-goods game
• Cleverly handling the donation information can promote cooperation in public goods game
• Information disclosure under liability: an experiment on public bads

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

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