Implementing Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations

DOI10.2307/1910993MaRDI QIDQ3675838zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gabrielle Demange

Publication date 1984

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/1910993

zbMATH Keywords

divide and choose methodefficiency-justice dilemmaefficient egalitarian equivalent allocationsexchange economyperfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cited in

(31)

• The equitable dispersion problem
• Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets
• Efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations over a single good
• Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
• A characterization of egalitarian equivalence
• Axiomatization of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games
• The procedural egalitarian solution
• Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games
• Gabrielle Demange
• Dissolving a partnership securely
• Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
• An equilibrium analysis of Knaster's fair division procedure
• Divide-and-permute
• Egalitarianism in the queueing problem
• Social preferences for the evaluation of procedures
• Dissolving a partnership dynamically
• A simple implementation of efficient allocations
• On the existence of an equitable allocation
• No-envy in the queueing problem with multiple identical machines
• Discounted tree solutions
• An experiment on the Nash program: a comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value
• Mechanism design in fair sequencing
• Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogeneous objects
• Fair division with money and prices: bid \& sell versus divide \& choose
• Introduction to the special issue in honor of Michel Grabisch
• Truncated egalitarian solutions
• Sharing the cost of a public good: an incentive-constrained axiomatic approach
• Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support
• An efficient and egalitarian negotiation procedure for economies with externalities
• Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
• Fair division under joint ownership: Recent results and open problems

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