Generalized Groves-Ledyard mechanisms

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.01.005MaRDI QIDQ523018zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paul J. Healy, Ritesh Jain

Publication date 20 April 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.005

zbMATH Keywords

demand revelationNash implementationpublic goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cites work

• A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
• A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments
• Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension
• Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments
• Incentives in Teams
• Instability in the implementation of Walrasian allocations
• Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
• On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria
• On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• The Existence of Efficient and Incentive Compatible Equilibria with Public Goods

Cited in

(6)

• Give and let give: alternative mechanisms based on voluntary contributions
• A Shapley-based Groves mechanism: when the mechanism designer plays the \textit{wise man}
• Are Groves-Ledyard Equilibria Attainable?
• A characterization of equilibria in the Groves-Ledyard mechanism
• The Walker-Groves-Ledyard mechanism: improving individual rationality without sacrificing simplicity or stability
• Counting Groves-Ledyard equilibria via degree theory

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