Smooth versus discontinuous mechanisms

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(84)90169-1zbMATH Open1273.91140OpenAlexW1988898872MaRDI QIDQ374987FDOQ374987

Authors: Stefan Reichelstein 

Publication date: 24 October 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(84)90169-1

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (5)

• Dynamic implementation in two-agent economies
• A feasible Nash implementation of Walrasian equilibria in the two-agent economy
• Regular equilibria and negative welfare implications in delegation games
• Nash implementation of the Lindahl performance in economies with just two consumers: an impossibility result
• Discrete implementation of the Groves-Ledyard mechanism

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