Walrasian allocations without price-taking behavior

DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2680zbMath0983.91034MaRDI QIDQ1592827

Roberto Serrano, Oscar Volij

Publication date: 23 April 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/8461cad0589e0363aefed1289dfc9b8abf504ee4

zbMATH Keywords

exchange economy; perfect competition; Walrasian equilibrium; interactive choice set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B52: Special types of economic equilibria

91B54: Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)

Related Items

Walrasian bargaining., The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets, Competitive bargaining equilibrium, Endogenous market integration, manipulation and limits to arbitrage

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