Walrasian allocations without price-taking behavior
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Publication:1592827
DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2680zbMath0983.91034MaRDI QIDQ1592827
Publication date: 23 April 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/8461cad0589e0363aefed1289dfc9b8abf504ee4
91B52: Special types of economic equilibria
91B54: Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)
Related Items
Walrasian bargaining., The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets, Competitive bargaining equilibrium, Endogenous market integration, manipulation and limits to arbitrage
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