Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
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Cited in
(38)- On strategy-proof social choice correspondences
- Expected utility consistent extensions of preferences
- Choosers as extension axioms
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- A trade-off result for preference revelation
- On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness
- Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures
- Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies
- On the manipulation of social choice correspondences
- A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
- Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives
- Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
- Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
- Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties
- A decomposition of strategy-proofness
- A unifying impossibility theorem
- A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives
- Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation
- On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
- FUZZY VOTERS, CRISP VOTES
- Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
- Taxonomy of powerful voters and manipulation in the framework of social choice functions
- Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
- Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility
- Tops-only domains
- Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
- On the manipulability of allocation rules through endowment augmentation
- Strategy-proof interval-social choice correspondences over extended single-peaked domains
- Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
- On strategy-proof social choice correspondences: a comment
- Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
- Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions
- An extension of the Moulin no show paradox for voting correspondences
- Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
- Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
- Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
- Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
- A characterization of dictatorial social choice correspondences with continuous preferences
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