Auctions with interdependent valuations

DOI10.1007/BF01254384MaRDI QIDQ1814782zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Peter Funk

Publication date 31 October 1996

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsinterdependent valuations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(10)

• Extremism drives out moderation
• Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations
• An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations
• When and why not to auction
• Sequential auctions and externalities
• Nearest Neighbor Classification and Search
• The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities
• The declining price anomaly is not universal in multi-buyer sequential auctions (but almost is)
• The best-shot all-pay (group) auction with complete information
• Contests with multiple alternative prizes: public-good/bad prizes and externalities

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