Public-Good Provision with Many Participants

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00257zbMath1104.91301MaRDI QIDQ4817921

Martin F. Hellwig

Publication date: 21 September 2004

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00257

zbMATH Keywords

individual rationality; isoelastic; second-best allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B18: Public goods

91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)

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