Tournaments with prize-setting agents

DOI10.1111/J.1467-9442.2011.01654.XzbMATH Open1222.91020OpenAlexW3126135348MaRDI QIDQ3173497FDOQ3173497

Authors: Kristoffer W. Eriksen, Ola Kvaløy, Trond E. Olsen 

Publication date: 10 October 2011

Published in: Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11250/164121

Recommendations

• Tournaments and piece rates revisited: a theoretical and experimental study of output-dependent prize tournaments
• The effort-maximizing contest with heterogeneous prizes
• Participation incentives in rank order tournaments with endogenous entry
• Designing Multiperson Tournaments with Asymmetric Contestants: An Experimental Study
• When higher prizes lead to lower efforts -- the impact of favoritism in tournaments

zbMATH Keywords

experimentincentivestournament theoryprize spread

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Cites Work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Incentives, Bargaining and the Wage Structure

Cited In (6)

• The role of inequality on effort in tournaments
• Tournaments and piece rates revisited: a theoretical and experimental study of output-dependent prize tournaments
• Splitting leagues
• Prize and incentives in double-elimination tournaments
• When higher prizes lead to lower efforts -- the impact of favoritism in tournaments
• Entry regulations and optimal prize allocation in parallel contests

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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