Tournaments with prize-setting agents

DOI10.1111/J.1467-9442.2011.01654.XMaRDI QIDQ3173497zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kristoffer W. Eriksen, Ola Kvaløy, Trond E. Olsen

Publication date 10 October 2011

Published in Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/11250/164121

zbMATH Keywords

experimentincentivestournament theoryprize spread

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Incentives, Bargaining and the Wage Structure
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents

Cited in

(6)

• Splitting leagues
• The role of inequality on effort in tournaments
• Tournaments and piece rates revisited: a theoretical and experimental study of output-dependent prize tournaments
• Prize and incentives in double-elimination tournaments
• Entry regulations and optimal prize allocation in parallel contests
• When higher prizes lead to lower efforts -- the impact of favoritism in tournaments

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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