Tournaments with prize-setting agents
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Publication:3173497
DOI10.1111/J.1467-9442.2011.01654.XzbMATH Open1222.91020OpenAlexW3126135348MaRDI QIDQ3173497FDOQ3173497
Authors: Kristoffer W. Eriksen, Ola Kvaløy, Trond E. Olsen
Publication date: 10 October 2011
Published in: Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11250/164121
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Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)
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