Tournaments and piece rates revisited: a theoretical and experimental study of output-dependent prize tournaments

DOI10.1007/S10058-015-0184-7zbMath1349.91119OpenAlexW2227658232MaRDI QIDQ283189

Ori Weisel, René Levínský, Kerstin Pull, Güth, Werner

Publication date: 13 May 2016

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/31847/1/Premium_roed_final_total.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

experimenttournamentsprincipal-agentrelative performance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (2)

Do output-dependent prizes alleviate the sabotage problem in tournaments? ⋮ Asymptotic efficiency of the proportional compensation scheme for a large number of producers

Cites Work

• Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: cost structure and prize allocation rules
• Contests with rank-order spillovers
• Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
• Contingent payments in selection contests
• March Madness and the Office Pool
• Relative Performance Compensation, Contests, and Dynamic Incentives

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