Amortizing securities as a Pareto-efficient reward mechanism

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-38227-8_25zbMATH Open1437.91306OpenAlexW3004591121MaRDI QIDQ5114933FDOQ5114933

Authors: Hwan C. Lin 

Publication date: 29 June 2020

Published in: Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38227-8_25

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zbMATH Keywords

innovationsocial optimalityamortizing securitieshead taxpayoutspublic reward

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

• Too much of a good thing? The economics of investment in R\&D
• On the Performance of Patents

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