Amortizing securities as a Pareto-efficient reward mechanism

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-38227-8_25MaRDI QIDQ5114933zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hwan C. Lin

Publication date 29 June 2020

Published in Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38227-8_25

zbMATH Keywords

innovationsocial optimalityamortizing securitieshead taxpayoutspublic reward

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

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Cites work

• On the Performance of Patents
• Too much of a good thing? The economics of investment in R\&D

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