Runner-up patents: is monopoly inevitable?

DOI10.1111/J.1467-9442.2010.01603.XMaRDI QIDQ3065337zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Emeric Henry

Publication date 5 January 2011

Published in Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/c8dmi8nm4pdjkuc9g8gjo2i2i

zbMATH Keywords

patentsdeadweight lossoptimal mix of instrumentssecond inventor

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Welfare economics (91B15)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3392476 (Why is no real title available?)
• Market Structure and Innovation

Cited in

(7)

• Dynamic competition and intellectual property rights in a model of product development
• Sequential innovation, naked exclusion, and upfront lump-sum payments
• On the social desirability of patents for sequential innovations in a vertically differentiated market
• Shared patent rights and technological progress
• Amortizing securities as a Pareto-efficient reward mechanism
• Patent replacement and welfare gains
• Optimal rules for patent races

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