Runner-up patents: is monopoly inevitable?

DOI10.1111/J.1467-9442.2010.01603.XzbMATH Open1202.91083OpenAlexW2139402525MaRDI QIDQ3065337FDOQ3065337

Authors: Emeric Henry 

Publication date: 5 January 2011

Published in: Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/c8dmi8nm4pdjkuc9g8gjo2i2i

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zbMATH Keywords

patentsdeadweight lossoptimal mix of instrumentssecond inventor

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

• Market Structure and Innovation
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (7)

• Dynamic competition and intellectual property rights in a model of product development
• Optimal rules for patent races
• Shared patent rights and technological progress
• On the social desirability of patents for sequential innovations in a vertically differentiated market
• Sequential innovation, naked exclusion, and upfront lump-sum payments
• Amortizing securities as a Pareto-efficient reward mechanism
• Patent replacement and welfare gains

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