Optimal contracting and the organization of knowledge

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDU043MaRDI QIDQ4610721zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors William Fuchs, Luis Garicano, Luis Rayo

Publication date 23 January 2019

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1308.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

hierarchiesoptimal contractingdouble-sided adverse selectionendogenous principalprofessional service firmsventure captial

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• Optimal contracting with private knowledge of wealth and ability
• Optimal contracts for experimentation
• Incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge
• The organization of expertise in the presence of communication
• Learning, Corporate Control and Performance Requirements in Venture Capital Contracts

Cited in

(1)

• Knowledge accumulation within an organization

This page was built for publication: Optimal contracting and the organization of knowledge

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4610721)