Learning, Corporate Control and Performance Requirements in Venture Capital Contracts

DOI10.2307/2526845MaRDI QIDQ3479756zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors

Publication date 1990

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2526845

zbMATH Keywords

innovationnew technologiestwo-period agency modelventure capital market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

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Cited in

(9)

• Staged financing: a trade-off theory of holdup and option value
• Venture investment incentive mechanisms and simulation with venture entrepreneurs having multistage efforts based on fairness preference theory
• Multistage effort and the equity structure of venture investment based on reciprocity motivation
• Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts
• Entrepreneurial Ability, Venture Investments, and Risk Sharing
• Decision-making intervention based venture capital contract model
• Venture Capital Meets Contract Theory: Risky Claims or Formal Control?*
• Optimal contracting and the organization of knowledge
• Incentive contracting for venture capital fund managers

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