Can evolutionary dynamics explain free riding in experiments?

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(91)90047-OzbMATH Open0729.90627MaRDI QIDQ806745FDOQ806745

John H. Miller, James Andreoni

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Problems related to evolution (92D15) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

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• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
• Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
• An evolutionary interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination
• Evolutionary equilibria resistant to mutation

Cited In (5)

• Compliance with Social Norms as an Evolutionary Stable Equilibrium
• Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
• Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
• Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods
• Evolutionary dynamics in public good games

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