Can evolutionary dynamics explain free riding in experiments?

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(91)90047-OMaRDI QIDQ806745zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors John H. Miller, James Andreoni

Publication date 1991

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Problems related to evolution (92D15) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Public goods (91B18)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4160522 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3497315 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 194544 (Why is no real title available?)
• Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
• An evolutionary interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination
• Evolutionary equilibria resistant to mutation
• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
• The evolution of cooperation
• The logic of animal conflict

Cited in

(5)

• Evolutionary dynamics in public good games
• Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
• Compliance with social norms as an evolutionary stable equilibrium
• Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
• Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods

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