Bayesian learning, smooth approximate optimal behavior, and convergence to -Nash equilibrium

DOI10.3982/ECTA9332MaRDI QIDQ4614264zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Yuichi Noguchi

Publication date 30 January 2019

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA9332

zbMATH Keywords

\(\eta\)-learning to predict strategies\(\varepsilon\)-Nash equilibriumBayesian learningconvergencesmooth approximate optimal behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cited in

(9)

• A Bayesian optimization approach to find Nash equilibria
• Convergence and approximation results for non-cooperative Bayesian games: Learning theorems
• Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games
• The possibility of Bayesian learning in repeated games
• Bayesian Nash equilibrium and variational inequalities
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• On ε-Optimality of the Pursuit Learning Algorithm
• A Constructive Proof that Learning in Repeated Games Leads to Nash Equilibria
• Learning in Games

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