Adapting paths against zero-determinant strategies in repeated prisoner's dilemma games
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Publication:2676037
DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2022.111211zbMath1497.91033arXiv2111.00479OpenAlexW3208642067MaRDI QIDQ2676037
Azumi Mamiya, Daiki Miyagawa, Genki Ichinose
Publication date: 27 September 2022
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.00479
repeated gamesdiscount factorprisoner's dilemmazero-determinant strategiesadapting pathadaptive player
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