Autocratic strategies for alternating games

DOI10.1016/j.tpb.2016.09.004zbMath1368.91027arXiv1602.02792OpenAlexW3100556232WikidataQ49018759 ScholiaQ49018759MaRDI QIDQ2014384

Alex McAvoy, Christoph Hauert

Publication date: 11 August 2017

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1602.02792

zbMATH Keywords

game theorycooperationextortionzero-determinant strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (6)

Adapting paths against zero-determinant strategies in repeated prisoner's dilemma games ⋮ Zero-determinant strategies in finitely repeated games ⋮ Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in repeated prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Zero-determinant strategies in repeated asymmetric games ⋮ Conditions for the existence of zero-determinant strategies under observation errors in repeated games ⋮ Controlling conditional expectations by zero-determinant strategies

Cites Work

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• The evolution of stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
• What you gotta know to play good in the iterated prisoner's dilemma
• Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
• Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
• Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games
• From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
• The Calculus of Selfishness

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