Autocratic strategies for alternating games

DOI10.1016/J.TPB.2016.09.004zbMATH Open1368.91027arXiv1602.02792OpenAlexW3100556232WikidataQ49018759 ScholiaQ49018759MaRDI QIDQ2014384FDOQ2014384

Alex McAvoy, Christoph Hauert

Publication date: 11 August 2017

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Repeated games have a long tradition in the behavioral sciences and evolutionary biology. Recently, strategies were discovered that permit an unprecedented level of control over repeated interactions by enabling a player to unilaterally enforce linear constraints on payoffs. Here, we extend this theory of "zero-determinant" (or, more generally, "autocratic") strategies to alternating games, which are often biologically more relevant than traditional synchronous games. Alternating games naturally result in asymmetries between players because the first move matters or because players might not move with equal probabilities. In a strictly-alternating game with two players, $X$ and $Y$, we give conditions for the existence of autocratic strategies for player $X$ when (i) $X$ moves first and (ii) $Y$ moves first. Furthermore, we show that autocratic strategies exist even for (iii) games with randomly-alternating moves. Particularly important categories of autocratic strategies are extortionate and generous strategies, which enforce unfavorable and favorable outcomes for the opponent, respectively. We illustrate these strategies using the continuous Donation Game, in which a player pays a cost to provide a benefit to the opponent according to a continuous cooperative investment level. Asymmetries due to alternating moves could easily arise from dominance hierarchies, and we show that they can endow subordinate players with more autocratic strategies than dominant players.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1602.02792

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zbMATH Keywords

game theorycooperationextortionzero-determinant strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• The Calculus of Selfishness
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• The evolution of stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
• Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
• Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games
• Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma
• From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
• Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
• What you gotta know to play good in the iterated prisoner's dilemma

Cited In (7)

• Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in repeated prisoner's dilemma game
• Zero-determinant strategies in repeated asymmetric games
• Zero-determinant strategies in finitely repeated games
• Conditions for the existence of zero-determinant strategies under observation errors in repeated games
• Adapting paths against zero-determinant strategies in repeated prisoner's dilemma games
• Controlling conditional expectations by zero-determinant strategies
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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