Abstract: Repeated games have a long tradition in the behavioral sciences and evolutionary biology. Recently, strategies were discovered that permit an unprecedented level of control over repeated interactions by enabling a player to unilaterally enforce linear constraints on payoffs. Here, we extend this theory of "zero-determinant" (or, more generally, "autocratic") strategies to alternating games, which are often biologically more relevant than traditional synchronous games. Alternating games naturally result in asymmetries between players because the first move matters or because players might not move with equal probabilities. In a strictly-alternating game with two players, and , we give conditions for the existence of autocratic strategies for player when (i) moves first and (ii) moves first. Furthermore, we show that autocratic strategies exist even for (iii) games with randomly-alternating moves. Particularly important categories of autocratic strategies are extortionate and generous strategies, which enforce unfavorable and favorable outcomes for the opponent, respectively. We illustrate these strategies using the continuous Donation Game, in which a player pays a cost to provide a benefit to the opponent according to a continuous cooperative investment level. Asymmetries due to alternating moves could easily arise from dominance hierarchies, and we show that they can endow subordinate players with more autocratic strategies than dominant players.
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Cites work
- Evolution of extortion in iterated prisoner's dilemma games
- Extortion and cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma
- From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
- Game theory
- Iterated prisoner's dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
- Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma
- The calculus of selfishness.
- The evolution of cooperation
- The evolution of stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
- What you gotta know to play good in the iterated prisoner's dilemma
Cited in
(8)- Conditions for the existence of zero-determinant strategies under observation errors in repeated games
- Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in repeated prisoner's dilemma game
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2113491 (Why is no real title available?)
- Controlling conditional expectations by zero-determinant strategies
- Cooperation and control in asymmetric repeated games
- Zero-determinant strategies in repeated asymmetric games
- Adapting paths against zero-determinant strategies in repeated prisoner's dilemma games
- Zero-determinant strategies in finitely repeated games
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