Outcome destabilization

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2026.01.004MaRDI QIDQ6839174zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Francesc Dilmé

Publication date 24 March 2026

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2026.01.004

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

• A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Extended proper equilibrium
• Finitely Repeated Games
• Iterated exclusion of implausible types in signaling games
• Justifiable Beliefs in Sequential Equilibrium
• Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium
• Proper rationalizability and backward induction
• Proper rationalizability in lexicographic beliefs
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Sequential Equilibria
• Sequentially stable outcomes
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games
• The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium
• The folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies

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