An early paper on the refinement of Nash equilibrium

DOI10.1215/S0012-7094-95-08107-1zbMath0944.91004MaRDI QIDQ1913576

Roger B. Myerson

Publication date: 21 May 1996

Published in: Duke Mathematical Journal (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumfixed point theoremproper equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (2)

An extragradient method for non-monotone equilibrium problems on Hadamard manifolds with applications ⋮ Nash-type equilibria on Riemannian manifolds: a variational approach

Cites Work

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• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Non-cooperative games
• A generalization of Brouwer's fixed point theorem
• Sequential Equilibria
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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