Learning to play efficient coarse correlated equilibria
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Publication:1741209
DOI10.1007/s13235-018-0244-zzbMath1411.91117arXiv1512.02160OpenAlexW2791232707WikidataQ130183742 ScholiaQ130183742MaRDI QIDQ1741209
Holly P. Borowski, Jeff S. Shamma, Jason R. Marden
Publication date: 3 May 2019
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1512.02160
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