NASH EQUILIBRIA FROM THE CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA VIEWPOINT
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Publication:4485672
DOI10.1142/S0219198999000049zbMATH Open1028.91501MaRDI QIDQ4485672FDOQ4485672
Authors: Sabrina Gomez Canovas, Pierre Hansen, Brigitte Jaumard 
Publication date: 19 June 2000
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- Non-cooperative games
- Equilibrium points in n -person games
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- Maximal nash subsets for bimatrix games
- On weakly completely mixed bimatrix games
- Existence of Correlated Equilibria
- A note on correlated equilibrium
- Completely Mixed Strategies in Bimatrix Games
- On nash subsets and mobility chains in bimatrix games
Cited In (11)
- A note on perfect correlated equilibria
- On the geometry of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria
- A RELATION BETWEEN NASH EQUILIBRIA AND CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA
- Correlated equilibria and communication in games
- On the geometry of Nash and correlated equilibria with cumulative prospect theoretic preferences
- A generalization of correlated equilibrium: a new protocol
- Existence of Correlated Equilibria
- Structure of extreme correlated equilibria: A zero-sum example and its implications
- Correlation without mediation: Expanding the set of equilibrium outcomes by ``cheap pre-play procedures
- Correlated Nash equilibrium
- Improving Nash by coarse correlation
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