Structure of extreme correlated equilibria: A zero-sum example and its implications

DOI10.1007/S00182-010-0267-1zbMATH Open1233.91051arXiv1002.0035OpenAlexW3102826264MaRDI QIDQ647346FDOQ647346

Authors: N. D. Stein, Asuman Ozdaglar, Pablo A. Parrilo 

Publication date: 23 November 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We exhibit the rich structure of the set of correlated equilibria by analyzing the simplest of polynomial games: the mixed extension of matching pennies. We show that while the correlated equilibrium set is convex and compact, the structure of its extreme points can be quite complicated. In finite games the ratio of extreme correlated to extreme Nash equilibria can be greater than exponential in the size of the strategy spaces. In polynomial games there can exist extreme correlated equilibria which are not finitely supported; we construct a large family of examples using techniques from ergodic theory. We show that in general the set of correlated equilibrium distributions of a polynomial game cannot be described by conditions on finitely many moments (means, covariances, etc.), in marked contrast to the set of Nash equilibria which is always expressible in terms of finitely many moments.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1002.0035

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zbMATH Keywords

ergodic theoryextreme pointscorrelated equilibriapolynomial games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44)

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Cited In (4)

• Equilibrium payoffs of finite games
• Existence of sparsely supported correlated equilibria
• Correlated equilibria in continuous games: characterization and computation
• Correlated equilibria of games with many players

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