Equilibrium payoffs of finite games

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Publication:533910

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2010.10.007zbMATH Open1211.91018arXiv0902.2770OpenAlexW2090151428MaRDI QIDQ533910FDOQ533910


Authors: Ehud Lehrer, Eilon Solan, Yannick Viossat Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 10 May 2011

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We study the structure of the set of equilibrium payoffs in finite games, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. A nonempty subset of R^2 is shown to be the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of a bimatrix game if and only if it is a finite union of rectangles. Furthermore, we show that for any nonempty finite union of rectangles U and any polytope P in R^2 containing U, there exists a bimatrix game with U as set of Nash equilibrium payoffs and P as set of correlated equilibrium payoffs. The n-player case and the robustness of this result to perturbation of the payoff matrices are also studied.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0902.2770




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