Exact enforcement value of soft correlated equilibrium for generalized chicken and prisoner's dilemma games

DOI10.1007/s10100-018-0575-2OpenAlexW2887275075WikidataQ129337841 ScholiaQ129337841MaRDI QIDQ2303330

Ferenc Forgó

Publication date: 3 March 2020

Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-018-0575-2

zbMATH Keywords

congestion gamesprisoners' dilemmaenforcement valuechicken gamesoft correlated equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90Bxx)

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