N‐person Prisoner's Dilemma†

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Publication:4777098

DOI10.1080/0022250X.1973.9989822zbMath0288.90091OpenAlexW1991991900MaRDI QIDQ4777098

Henry Hamburger

Publication date: 1973

Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.1973.9989822




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