Correlation and duopoly

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(78)90059-5zbMath0403.90014OpenAlexW2089351194MaRDI QIDQ1256389

H. Moulin, Louis-André Gérard-Varet

Publication date: 1978

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(78)90059-5

zbMATH Keywords

DuopolyMarket StructureCournot Equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (10)

Coarse correlated equilibria in linear duopoly games ⋮ Correlated equilibria and Rayleigh quotient in Cournot-Nash games ⋮ Equilibrium design in an \(n\)-player quadratic game ⋮ Improving Nash by coarse correlation ⋮ Correlated relaxed equilibria in nonzero-sum linear differential games ⋮ On weakly correlated and correlated equilibria in discontinuous games ⋮ Exact enforcement value of soft correlated equilibrium for generalized chicken and prisoner's dilemma games ⋮ Communication and cooperation in repeated games ⋮ Correlated equilibrium under costly disobedience ⋮ Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium

Cites Work

• Strategically zero-sum games: The class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Correlated equilibria in some classes of two-person games
• Cooperation in Mixed Equilibrium
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