Correlation and duopoly

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(78)90059-5zbMath0403.90014MaRDI QIDQ1256389

H. Moulin, Louis-André Gérard-Varet

Publication date: 1978

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(78)90059-5

zbMATH Keywords

Duopoly; Market Structure; Cournot Equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A80: Applications of game theory

91B50: General equilibrium theory

Related Items

Communication and cooperation in repeated games, On weakly correlated and correlated equilibria in discontinuous games, Equilibrium design in an \(n\)-player quadratic game, Correlated relaxed equilibria in nonzero-sum linear differential games, Correlated equilibrium under costly disobedience, Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium, Exact enforcement value of soft correlated equilibrium for generalized chicken and prisoner's dilemma games, Coarse correlated equilibria in linear duopoly games, Improving Nash by coarse correlation, Correlated equilibria and Rayleigh quotient in Cournot-Nash games

Cites Work

• Strategically zero-sum games: The class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Correlated equilibria in some classes of two-person games
• Cooperation in Mixed Equilibrium
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