Measuring the power of soft correlated equilibrium in 2-facility simple non-increasing linear congestion games

DOI10.1007/S10100-012-0279-YzbMATH Open1339.91026OpenAlexW1994347737MaRDI QIDQ301158FDOQ301158

Authors: Ferenc Forgó 

Publication date: 29 June 2016

Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-012-0279-y

Recommendations

• On the enforcement value of soft correlated equilibrium for two-facility, non-increasing, simple linear congestion games
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zbMATH Keywords

correlationcongestion gamesenforcement valuemediation value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) 2-person games (91A05) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Cites Work

• How bad is selfish routing?
• Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung
• Strategically zero-sum games: The class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Choice of routes in congested traffic networks: Experimental tests of the Braess paradox
• An O(n) algorithm for the multiple-choice knapsack linear program
• On the Value of Correlation
• Algorithms – ESA 2005
• A generalization of correlated equilibrium: a new protocol

Cited In (4)

• The power of mediation in an extended El Farol game
• The price of mediation
• On the enforcement value of soft correlated equilibrium for two-facility, non-increasing, simple linear congestion games
• Exact enforcement value of soft correlated equilibrium for generalized chicken and prisoner's dilemma games

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