Open-minded imitation can achieve near-optimal vaccination coverage

DOI10.1007/S00285-019-01401-ZMaRDI QIDQ2330622zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Ying Xin, Winfried Just, D. J. Gerberry

Publication date 22 October 2019

Published in Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.08789

zbMATH Keywords

Fermi functionimitationvaccination dilemmavaccination game imitation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Applications of game theory (91A80) Medical epidemiology (92C60)

Abstract: Studies of voluntary vaccination decisions by rational individuals predict that the population will reach a Nash equilibrium with vaccination coverage below the societal optimum. Human decision-making involves mechanisms in addition to rational calculations of self-interest, such as imitation of successful others. Previous research had shown that imitation alone cannot achieve better results. Under realistic choices of the parameters it may lead to equilibrium vaccination coverage even below the Nash equilibrium. However, these findings rely on the widely accepted use of Fermi functions for modeling the probabilities of switching to another strategy. We consider here a more general functional form of the switching probabilities. It is consistent with functions that give best fits for empirical data in a widely cited psychological experiment and involves one additional parameter $alpha$. This parameter can be loosely interpreted as a degree of open-mindedness. We found both by means of simulations and analytically that sufficiently high values of $alpha$ will drive the equilibrium vaccination coverage arbitrarily close to the societal optimum.

Recommendations

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Cited in

(11)

• A game-theoretic model of rabies in domestic dogs with multiple voluntary preventive measures
• Vaccination behavior by coupling the epidemic spreading with the human decision under the game theory
• Open-minded imitation can achieve near-optimal vaccination coverage
• Imitation dynamics of vaccine decision-making behaviours based on the game theory
• The impact of other-regarding tendencies on the spatial vaccination game
• Erratum to: ``Impact of imitation processes on the effectiveness of ring vaccination
• Vaccinating behaviour guided by imitation and aspiration
• Revealing decision-making strategies of Americans in taking COVID-19 vaccination
• Linking spontaneous behavioral changes to disease transmission dynamics: behavior change includes periodic oscillation
• The existence of oscillating patterns of a game-theoretical SIR model with age structure
• Dynamics of COVID-19 based on spontaneous individual behaviors of vaccination

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