Modeling the interplay between seasonal flu outcomes and individual vaccination decisions
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Publication:2113595
DOI10.1007/S11538-021-00988-ZzbMATH Open1486.92113arXiv2101.07926OpenAlexW4220675177WikidataQ113900080 ScholiaQ113900080MaRDI QIDQ2113595FDOQ2113595
Steven Strogatz, Irena Papst, Kevin P. O'Keeffe
Publication date: 14 March 2022
Published in: Bulletin of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: Seasonal influenza presents an ongoing challenge to public health. The rapid evolution of the flu virus necessitates annual vaccination campaigns, but the decision to get vaccinated or not in a given year is largely voluntary, at least in the United States, and many people decide against it. In early attempts to model these yearly flu vaccine decisions, it was often assumed that individuals behave rationally, and do so with perfect information -- assumptions that allowed the techniques of classical economics and game theory to be applied. However, the usual assumptions are contradicted by the emerging empirical evidence about human decision-making behavior in this context. We develop a simple model of coupled disease spread and vaccination dynamics that instead incorporates experimental observations from social psychology to model annual vaccine decision-making more realistically. We investigate population-level effects of these new decision-making assumptions, with the goal of understanding whether the population can self-organize into a state of herd immunity, and if so, under what conditions. Our model agrees with established results while also revealing more subtle population-level behavior, including biennial oscillations about the herd immunity threshold.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2101.07926
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Cites Work
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- Vaccination and the theory of games
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Cited In (6)
- Моделирование социально-психологических процессов формирования позиции населения относительно вакцинопрофилактики в условиях информационной пропаганды;Modeling of socio-psychological processes of formation of the population's position on vaccine prevention within the context of information propaganda
- Propagation thresholds in a diffusive epidemic model with latency and vaccination
- Parameterizing a dynamic influenza model using longitudinal versus age-stratified case notifications yields different predictions of vaccine impacts
- Long-term potential of imperfect seasonal flu vaccine in presence of natural immunity
- Assessing the effect of an influenza vaccine in an encouragement design
- Living with influenza: Impacts of government imposed and voluntarily selected interventions
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