Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in vaccination games

DOI10.1080/17513758.2016.1213319zbMath1448.92120OpenAlexW2494548115WikidataQ42094643 ScholiaQ42094643MaRDI QIDQ3304637

Fan Bai

Publication date: 3 August 2020

Published in: Journal of Biological Dynamics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/17513758.2016.1213319

zbMATH Keywords

game theorypopulation dynamicsepidemiologyvaccination gameuniqueness of Nash equilibriumcompartmental epidemic modelsheterogeneous mixing populationfinal size relationshomogeneous mixing population

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Medical epidemiology (92C60) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

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