Evolutionarily rational mutations in structured populations
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Publication:6072232
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105677zbMath1527.91020OpenAlexW4380792642MaRDI QIDQ6072232
Publication date: 12 October 2023
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105677
evolutionary stabilityrepeated gamesevolutionary game theoryfinite populationsmutation strategiesendogenous mutations
Cites Work
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- The Evolution of Conventions
- EVOLUTION WITH ENDOGENOUS MUTATIONS
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