Imitation with asymmetric memory
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Publication:663184
DOI10.1007/s00199-010-0554-xzbMath1276.91031MaRDI QIDQ663184
Publication date: 14 February 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0554-x
91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory
Related Items
Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures, Local interactions under switching costs, Imitation in heterogeneous populations, Social coordination with locally observable types, Imitation in Cournot oligopolies with multiple markets, Information, interaction and memory, Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance, Cournot vs. Walras: a reappraisal through simulations, Cournot competition, imitation, and information networks, Robust stochastic stability, Asymmetric oligopoly and evolutionary stability, Long-run technology choice with endogenous local capacity, The value of (bounded) memory in a changing world
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