Imitation with asymmetric memory
From MaRDI portal
Publication:663184
DOI10.1007/s00199-010-0554-xzbMath1276.91031OpenAlexW2146546182MaRDI QIDQ663184
Publication date: 14 February 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0554-x
Related Items (15)
Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ Cournot vs. Walras: a reappraisal through simulations ⋮ Imitation in Cournot oligopolies with multiple markets ⋮ Information, interaction and memory ⋮ Coordination with heterogeneous interaction constraints ⋮ The value of (bounded) memory in a changing world ⋮ Cournot competition, imitation, and information networks ⋮ Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures ⋮ Local interactions under switching costs ⋮ Robust stochastic stability ⋮ Imitation in heterogeneous populations ⋮ Social coordination with locally observable types ⋮ Asymmetric oligopoly and evolutionary stability ⋮ Memory retrieval and harshness of conflict in the hawk-dove game ⋮ Long-run technology choice with endogenous local capacity
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- An evolutionary interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination
- Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution
- Comparative statics for aggregative games. The strong concavity case
- Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
- Evolutionary foundations of aggregate-taking behavior
- An evolutionary model of Bertrand oligopoly
- An evolutionary model of bargaining
- Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
- Learning, bounded memory, and inertia
- Decision rules with bounded memory
- Aggregative games and best-reply potentials
- The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior
- Conventional Contracts
- The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- A Memory-Based Model of Bounded Rationality
- Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- The Evolution of Conventions
- A Comment on "Learning, Mutation, and Long-Run Equilibria in Games"
This page was built for publication: Imitation with asymmetric memory
