Best-reply matching in games.

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00065-9zbMATH Open1064.91004MaRDI QIDQ1421925FDOQ1421925

Mark Voorneveld, Edward Droste, Michael Kosfeld

Publication date: 3 February 2004

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

MatchingEquilibriumBounded rationalityLearningGame theoryBest reply

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
• Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
• Maximal nash subsets for bimatrix games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
• Learning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics
• Experimental results on the centipede game in normal form: an investigation on learning
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A myopic adjustment process leading to best-reply matching.

Cited In (3)

• Best response equivalence
• A myopic adjustment process leading to best-reply matching.
• Competitive centipede games: zero-end payoffs and payoff inequality deter reciprocal cooperation

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