Evolutionary network games: equilibria from imitation and best response dynamics
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Publication:1674797
DOI10.1155/2017/7259032zbMATH Open1375.91024arXiv1403.1131OpenAlexW3102323395MaRDI QIDQ1674797FDOQ1674797
Authors: Giulio Cimini 
Publication date: 26 October 2017
Published in: Complexity (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We consider games of strategic substitutes and strategic complements on networks. We introduce two different evolutionary dynamics in order to refine their multiplicity of equilibria, and we analyse the system through a mean field approach. We find that for the best-shot game, taken as a model for substitutes, a replicator-like dynamics does not lead to Nash equilibria, whereas it leads to unique equilibria (full cooperation or full defection, depending on the initial condition and the game parameter) for complements, represented by a coordination game. On the other hand, when the dynamics becomes more cognitively demanding in the form of a best response evolution, predictions are always Nash equilibria (at least when individuals are fully rational): For the best-shot game we find equilibria with a definite value of the fraction of contributors, whereas for the coordination game symmetric equilibria arise only for low or high initial fractions of cooperators. We also extend our study by considering complex heterogeneous topologies, and show that the nature of the selected equilibria does not change for the best-shot game. However for coordination games we reveal an important difference, namely that on infinitely large scale-free networks cooperation arises for any value of the incentive to cooperate.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1403.1131
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Cited In (14)
- Equilibria, information and frustration in heterogeneous network games with conflicting preferences
- Evolutionary dynamics of strategies without complete information on complex networks
- Pure Nash equilibriums and independent dominating sets in evolutionary games on networks
- Network structures and poverty traps
- Best response dynamics improve sustainability and equity outcomes in common-pool resources problems, compared to imitation dynamics
- Structural heterogeneity and evolutionary dynamics on complex networks
- Dynamic games on arbitrary networks with two types of players
- Co-evolutionary dynamics and Bayesian interaction games
- Evolutionary game dynamics and the analysis of agent-based imitation models: the long run, the medium run and the importance of global analysis
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- Information, interaction and memory
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- An evolutionary model with best response and imitative rules
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