A note on adjusted replicator dynamics in iterated games

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2009.08.001zbMath1197.91045OpenAlexW2073343547MaRDI QIDQ845018

Murat Alanyali

Publication date: 5 February 2010

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.08.001

zbMATH Keywords

reinforcement learningstochastic approximationsadjusted replicator dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• A behavioral learning process in games
• Payoff assessments without probabilities: a simple dynamic model of choice
• Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
• Learning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics
• Absolutely expedient imitative behavior
• Convergent multiple-timescales reinforcement learning algorithms in normal form games
• On the convergence of reinforcement learning
• Optimal properties of stimulus-response learning models.
• Continuous approximations of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• Continuous approximation of dynamical systems with randomly matched individuals
• Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games
• Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games
• Learning to make risk neutral choices in a symmetric world

This page was built for publication: A note on adjusted replicator dynamics in iterated games