A note on adjusted replicator dynamics in iterated games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:845018
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2009.08.001zbMATH Open1197.91045OpenAlexW2073343547MaRDI QIDQ845018FDOQ845018
Authors: Murat Alanyali
Publication date: 5 February 2010
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.08.001
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
- Optimal properties of stimulus-response learning models.
- Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games
- Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On the convergence of reinforcement learning
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Learning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics
- Continuous approximation of dynamical systems with randomly matched individuals
- Payoff assessments without probabilities: a simple dynamic model of choice
- Learning to make risk neutral choices in a symmetric world
- A behavioral learning process in games
- Absolutely expedient imitative behavior
- Continuous approximations of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
- Convergent multiple-timescales reinforcement learning algorithms in normal form games
Cited In (3)
This page was built for publication: A note on adjusted replicator dynamics in iterated games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q845018)