Equilibrium selection with coupled populations in hawk-dove games: theory and experiment in continuous time

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.06.003MaRDI QIDQ308644zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Volker Benndorf, Ismael Martínez-Martínez, Hans-Theo Normann

Publication date 6 September 2016

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.06.003

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theoryreplicator dynamicshawk-dove gameexperiment in continuous time

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Experimental studies (91A90) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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• Evolutionary games in natural, social, and virtual worlds
• Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
• Feedback spillover and analogy-based expectations: A multi-game experiment
• Learning across games
• On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play
• Separating the hawks from the doves: evidence from continuous time laboratory games
• The logic of animal conflict
• Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games

Cited in

(10)

• Separating the hawks from the doves: evidence from continuous time laboratory games
• Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time
• Equilibrium selection in hawk-dove games
• Population dynamics and its instability in a hawk-dove game on the network
• Asymmetric adaptivity induces recurrent synchronization in complex networks
• Fast game dynamics coupled to slow population dynamics: A single population with hawk-dove strategies
• An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics
• Beyond replicator dynamics: from frequency to density dependent models of evolutionary games
• Coordination and evolutionary dynamics: when are evolutionary models reliable?
• Perturbed best response dynamics in a hawk-dove game

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