Equilibrium selection with coupled populations in hawk-dove games: theory and experiment in continuous time
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.06.003zbMATH Open1371.91016OpenAlexW2474011848MaRDI QIDQ308644FDOQ308644
Authors: Volker Benndorf, Ismael Martínez-Martínez, Hans-Theo Normann 
Publication date: 6 September 2016
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.06.003
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Evolutionary games (91A22) Experimental studies (91A90) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
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Cited In (10)
- Equilibrium selection in hawk-dove games
- Fast game dynamics coupled to slow population dynamics: A single population with hawk-dove strategies
- Coordination and evolutionary dynamics: when are evolutionary models reliable?
- Beyond replicator dynamics: from frequency to density dependent models of evolutionary games
- Perturbed best response dynamics in a hawk-dove game
- Population dynamics and its instability in a hawk-dove game on the network
- Separating the hawks from the doves: evidence from continuous time laboratory games
- Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time
- An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics
- Asymmetric adaptivity induces recurrent synchronization in complex networks
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