Equilibrium selection with coupled populations in hawk-dove games: theory and experiment in continuous time
From MaRDI portal
Publication:308644
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.06.003zbMath1371.91016MaRDI QIDQ308644
Hans-Theo Normann, Ismael Martínez-Martínez, Volker Benndorf
Publication date: 6 September 2016
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.06.003
91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory
91A22: Evolutionary games
91A90: Experimental studies
Related Items
An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics, Perturbed best response dynamics in a hawk-dove game, Coordination and evolutionary dynamics: when are evolutionary models reliable?, Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time
Uses Software
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations
- Belief elicitation in experiments: Is there a hedging problem?
- Feedback spillover and analogy-based expectations: A multi-game experiment
- Separating the hawks from the doves: evidence from continuous time laboratory games
- An experiment on learning in a multiple games environment
- Learning across games
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
- Evolutionary game theory with two groups of individuals
- Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
- Evolutionary Games in Natural, Social, and Virtual Worlds
- Evolutionary Games in Economics
- Evolutionary game dynamics
- Cycles and Instability in a Rock-Paper-Scissors Population Game: A Continuous Time Experiment
- Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
- The Logic of Animal Conflict
- Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games
- On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play
- Analogies, adaptation, and anomalies
