Equilibrium selection in hawk-dove games

DOI10.3390/G15010002MaRDI QIDQ6555673zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Mario Blázquez de Paz, Nikita Koptyug

Publication date 14 June 2024

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/G15010002

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionhawk-dove gamesquantal response methodrobustness to strategic uncertainty methodtracing procedure method

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Equilibrium refinements (91A11) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites work

• Bertrand-Edgeworth Duopoly with Proportional Residual Demand
• Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly with unit cost asymmetry
• Endogenous price leadership
• Endogenous Stackelberg leadership
• Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
• Equilibrium selection with coupled populations in hawk-dove games: theory and experiment in continuous time
• Game theory
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• Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly
• Price Leadership
• Product differentiation in a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Robustness to strategic uncertainty
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, II: Applications

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