Probe and adjust in information transfer games

DOI10.1007/S10670-013-9467-YzbMATH Open1329.91019OpenAlexW2064276506MaRDI QIDQ907902FDOQ907902

Kevin J. S. Zollman, Brian Skyrms, Simon M. Huttegger

Publication date: 27 January 2016

Published in: Erkenntnis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9467-y

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Cites Work

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• Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system
• Learning to signal: Analysis of a micro-level reinforcement model
• Attainability of boundary points under reinforcement learning
• Emergence of information transfer by inductive learning
• Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability
• Learning by trial and error
• The role of forgetting in the evolution and learning of language
• Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
• Learning to collude tacitly on production levels by oligopolistic agents

Cited In (2)

• Emergence of information transfer by inductive learning
• A behavioral study of ``noise in coordination games

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