Oscillatory equilibrium in asymmetric evolutionary games: generalizing evolutionarily stable strategy
The main goal of this paper is to gain insights about the oscillatory outcomes in asymmetric games through the combined lenses of evolutionary game theory and information theory. Specifically, the authors put forward extensions of the usual concept of evolutionary stability for periodic orbits in discrete-time replicator dynamics. The extensions have been termed two-species heterogeneity stable orbit and two-species information stable orbit. In the former, the fitness weighted by heterogeneity is optimized during the replication-selection process, while in the latter, fitness itself is optimized directly.
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