The Value of Information in Selfish Routing
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Publication:5100972
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-54921-3_21OpenAlexW3046729404MaRDI QIDQ5100972
Simon Scherrer, Adrian Perrig, Stefan Schmid
Publication date: 1 September 2022
Published in: Structural Information and Communication Complexity (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.05191
Graph theory (including graph drawing) in computer science (68R10) Computer system organization (68Mxx) Communication complexity, information complexity (68Q11)
Cites Work
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- Adaptive routing with stale information
- Statistical analysis of network data. Methods and models
- Potential games
- A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
- How bad is selfish routing?
- Inefficiency of Nash Equilibria
- Informational Braess’ Paradox: The Effect of Information on Traffic Congestion
- Algorithmic Game Theory
- The Price of Stochastic Anarchy
- Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung
- Traffic assignment problem for a general network
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
- Potential games with continuous player sets
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