Stochastic imitative game dynamics with committed agents

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.018zbMath1247.91021MaRDI QIDQ449193

William H. Sandholm

Publication date: 12 September 2012

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.018

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selection; stochastic stability; evolutionary game theory; imitation; committed agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games

91A22: Evolutionary games

Related Items

Finite-population evolution with rare mutations in asymmetric games, Unnamed Item, Tributes to Bill Sandholm, Stochastic stability in the large population and small mutation limits for coordination games, Stochastic approximation to understand simple simulation models

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